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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) in its current shape and form is primarily a product of 
deepening economic integration, whereas a social dimension of European integration that 
would be comparable in ambition to its economic dimension has failed to manifest itself 
despite repeated attempts to give the social dimension greater weight. Based on a neo-
Gramscian theoretical perspective of hegemony, this can be attributed to the predominance 
of neo-liberal hegemony. However, the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 
highlighted some of the deficiencies of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that 
coordinates macro-economic policy without the capacity to ease the social impact of these 
policies on citizens. In turn, this facilitated a renewed interest in the social democratic 
project for a stronger social dimension. 
In order to assess if this led to a shift towards a greater concern for social policy objectives 
vis-à-vis economic ones in the context of European Economic Governance, this paper 
conducts a qualitative content analysis of the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs), 
which are part of this governance structure. 
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Introduction: 
The Social Dimension of European Integration – From Ambition to Neglect  
 
The European Union's (EU) response to the financial and economic crisis that began in 
2008 was by and large characterised by an acceleration of structural reform programmes 
and measures geared towards fiscal consolidation as a prerequisite for financial bailout 
packages. During the course of the crisis, these measures put tremendous strains on the 
social fabric of many member states, sometimes compounding the impact of the crisis 
itself. As a result, the public discourse challenging these policies manifested itself in two 
distinct responses. On the one hand, populist parties seized the opportunity to promote 
their Euro-sceptic and nationalistic agenda, often with the promise of national solidarity, 
and on the other hand, there was a renewed call for a social dimension of European 
integration.  
  
Although the political post-war consensus in Western Europe was dominated by social 
democratic principles based on goals such as full employment and social cohesion, there 
was no equivalent policy consensus in the European integration process and the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 established that social policy was essentially the domain of national 
governments. Nonetheless, the Treaty laid down some rules regarding social provisions 
such as the free movement of labour, the possibility of paying out statutory pensions in 
another member state and the European Social Fund, which was used to support projects 
for mobility, housing, equality and social inclusion. The first sincere attempt to pursue a 
social dimension, or Social Europe as it is sometimes referred to, was not initiated until the 
signing of the Social Charter in 1961 by the Council of Europe. This established extensive 
social rights and economic human rights, but with few binding mechanisms for 
implementation. Nonetheless, the Social Charter became a reference point for the 
European Commission and the EU in the Treaties. This was followed in 1974 by the Social 
Action Programme, which led to a number of directives concerning among other things 
workers' rights, occupational health and safety, living standards and gender equality.1 
However, most of the initiated directives were blocked by veto in the Council of the EU, 
despite a majority of member states that were in favour of these directives. This deadlock 
was only resolved through the 1986 Single European Act, which introduced qualified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lina Rutkauskiene, “Social Policy in the European Union: Variety and Challenges,” European Union: The 
New Phenomena of Social and Economic Development 1:25 (2010): 27. 
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majority voting, notably with regard to articles 108a (internal market) and 118a (health and 
safety).2  
 
As a result, the Council of the EU revived the momentum for Social Europe once more in 
the early 1990s during Jacques Delors' presidency of the European Commission (1985-95) 
and was essentially designed as a compensatory policy to the overall neo-liberal 
orientation of European integration in order to commit social democratic parties and trade 
unions to support integration. The result of this greater engagement with social democracy 
was the Social Protocol, in which member states committed to provide similar social 
provisions across the EU, as well as the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
for Workers, and the second European Social Action Programme.3 However, the social 
dimension of the EU subsequently slowed down, along with the relative decline of social 
democracy in Western Europe, which Chantal Mouffe ascribed to the attempt of left 
parties to transcend the left-right divide in a Third Way political strategy. Third way 
politics, characterised by Tony Blair's New Labour in the United Kingdom, and Gerhard 
Schröder's Agenda 2010 in Germany, by and large accepted the premises of the neo-liberal 
economic model, abandoning traditional resistance to it. However, according to Mouffe, “a 
well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions,”4 
otherwise it will be replaced by other forms of collective identification such as identity 
politics, which is evidently gaining ground in many European countries, not least in the 
form of Euro-sceptic parties.5 Social democracy's acceptance of a neo-liberal ideological 
hegemony led to the temporary demise of the social dimension of the EU throughout the 
early 2000s, only for it to reappear on the agenda following the financial and economic 
crisis. This was primarily a result of the disastrous impact of the crisis, as well as of the 
crisis response prescribed by the Troika (consisting of the European Commission, 
European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) on member states' social 
systems. For example, in Greece alone the health care budget was slashed by 25 per cent, 
leaving an estimated 800,000 persons without adequate access to health care.6 This even 
prompted an enquiry by the European Parliament on the role and operations of the Troika, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Alan Hick and Staffan Nilsson, “Vers un Nouveau Programme d’Action Sociale Européen et un Pacte 
d’Investissement Social Européen,” Revue française des affaires sociales 1:1 (2012). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2009), 104. 
5 Ibid., 104-109. 
6 Alexander Kentikelenis, Marina Karanikolos, Aaron Reeves, Martin McKee and David Stuckler, “Greece's 
Health Crisis: From Austerity to Denialism,” The Lancet 383 (22 Feb. 2014). 
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which in turn resulted in a critical report of its conduct in 2014.7 
 
While the EU's formal competencies in the area of social policy remain limited, a 
commitment to a sincere social dimension of the EU could offer a credible alternative to 
populist right wing parties, which take advantage of the current wave of Euro-scepticism 
across the continent for their own political ends. This is often done by promoting national 
solidarity, especially where the EU is blamed for the deterioration of the welfare state and 
social protection, and for the detrimental effects this has had on social cohesion, and 
increasing inequalities within and between member states.  
 
In turn, a stronger social dimension could conceivably be the necessary prerequisite to 
maintaining the pace of European integration and preventing it from retracting, something 
that has been suggested by the European Economic and Social Committee in a letter to the 
President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, in which the Committee argues 
that “the EU must act urgently to promote growth, jobs and social solidarity, or otherwise 
risk permanently alienating young people and losing citizens' adhesion to the European 
project as a whole.”8 The European Council on their part recognised this as well in their 
conclusions on completing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2012, which 
expressed the need “for Europe to remain a highly competitive social market economy and 
to preserve the European social model.”9 During the course of the financial and economic 
crisis, the European Commission – with the consent of the Council of the EU and other 
stakeholders such as the European Central Bank – facilitated a deepening of European 
integration by formalising its capabilities to intervene in the economic, financial, and 
social policies of Eurozone member states as part of a process called European Economic 
Governance. The annual cycle of the European Economic Governance is called the 
European Semester. Drawing on the Annual Growth Survey, which assesses the socio-
economic challenges and determines priorities for the European Semester, the European 
Commission identifies policy areas it wants to address in the Country-Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs), which it urges member states to implement in their respective 
National Reform Programmes. The EU 2020 Strategy's objectives, which set long-term 
targets for member states' growth and development, including social and environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 European Parliament, Resolution on the Role and Operations of the Troika with Regard to the Euro Area 
Programme Countries, 13 Mar. 2014, Strasbourg. 
8 European Economic and Social Committee letter to Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European 
Council, May 2013. 
9 European Council, European Council Conclusions on Completing EMU, 14 Dec. 2012, Brussels. 
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goals, are also embedded in the European Semester, and thus form a part of European 
Economic Governance. Although the EU’s competence to introduce binding reform 
programmes is limited to those member states that are subject to Economic Adjustment 
Programmes, the development of European Economic Governance in the context of the 
current crisis and potential future crises has tremendous implications for all member 
states.10 In addition, the European Council put forward proposals for a better coordination 
of national reforms in its roadmap on completing the EMU, suggesting that the CSRs will 
continue to gain importance in the future.11  
 
The demand for a stronger social dimension of the EU continues to be expressed by 
stakeholders such as trade unions, political parties, and official bodies of the EU such as 
the European Economic and Social Committee,12 as well as in the public discourse of some 
member states, for example in Sweden, where the Social Democratic Party and the 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation proposed the introduction of a social protocol in the 
EU Treaty.13 In response to this, the European Commission gradually introduced indicators 
to the Annual Growth Survey that keep track of member states' social developments in 
addition to economic ones. Further, the European Commission published the 
Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU14 on 2 October 2013, 
in which it announced plans to introduce a number of measures to monitor and strengthen 
social policy aspects, for example by suggesting the introduction of a social indicator 
scoreboard, EU action and funding to reduce unemployment, financial solidarity on a 
European level, improved labour mobility within the EU, and a strengthened European 
social dialogue.15 
 
Nonetheless, the Communication was received with reservations by many proponents of a 
Social Europe, including trade unions. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
responded in a position paper that stated, “for the ETUC the issue at stake is whether the 
EMU can have a Social Dimension capable of balancing economic policy with Europe’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Christophe Degryse, The New European Economic Governance (Brussels: ETUI, 2012). 
11 European Council, Completing EMU. 
12 European Economic and Social Committee, For a Social Dimension of European Economic and Monetary 
Union, 22 May 2013, Brussels. 
13 Swedish Trade Union Confederation, For a Social Europe: Report of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation Working Group for a Strategy to Introduce a Social Protocol in the EU 
Treaty, Mar. 2014, Stockholm. 
14 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union, 2 Oct. 2013, Brussels. 
15 Ibid. 
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social objectives. Our overall assessment of the Communication is that the proposals 
presented will do little to achieve this.”16 There are several reasons for such scepticism. 
Firstly, there appears to be doubt about how useful the Communication's suggestions are 
for building a sincere social democratic project. Although it proposes the introduction of a 
social indicator scoreboard to monitor and respond to developments in member states, it 
does not foresee reinforcement mechanisms similar to the ones which accompany its 
economic indicators, nor does it call into question the approach to structural reform that 
sometimes intensified the pressure on the social systems and populations of member states. 
Further, the European Commission acknowledges in the Communication that while some 
of the measures that are required for more solidarity and financial support “can be adopted 
within the limits of the current Treaties [...] others will require modifying the current 
Treaties and giving new competences to the EU.”17 In the end, questions of applicability, 
policy hierarchy and legitimacy remain largely unresolved, and it may seem that economic 
and fiscal considerations will continue to trump social concerns, leading to more of the 
same approach to social policies. Likewise, the European Commission's proposal that 
“labour mobility can to some extent also act as an adjustment mechanism in times of 
asymmetric changes”18 raises fears of involuntary migration forced by economic pressures, 
which could in the long run lead to a brain-drain of the most qualified individuals and 
long-term depression of whole regions and even entire member states.19 
 
Another reason for concern is related to the Communication's call for a stronger 
participation of the social partners (trade unions and employer organisations) in the 
European social dialogue. This is due to the fact that on the same day, the European 
Commission simultaneously published its Communication on Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps20, directly challenging the social dialogue 
and freezing for the first time a proposal on workplace health and safety in the hairdressing 
sector reached between the respective employer's organisation Coiffure EU and European 
trade union federation UNI Europa. This calls into question the sincerity of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC Position on the European Commission Communication on 
Strengthening the Social Dimension of Economic and Monetary Union, 3-4 Dec. 2013, Brussels, 
http://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-position-european-commission-communication-strengthening-social-
dimension-economic#.U3YgLF6dLwJ (last accessed 16 May 2014). 
17 European Commission, Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU. 
18 Ibid. 
19 European Parliament, Resolution on the Role and Operations of the Troika. 
20 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, 2 Oct. 2013, Brussels. 
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Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU published on the very 
same day. Further dismay was caused by the reaction of the President of the European 
Commission José Manuel Barroso, who publicly denounced the proposal of the social 
partners in the hairdressing sector to transform their agreement into binding EU legislation. 
In an interview with the German public television ARD, Barroso polemically declared that 
Europe does not need to regulate hairdressers' high heels, even though the agreement 
primarily concerns the use of chemicals in the sector whose employees are most at risk of 
work related skin disease.21 Barroso further announced with regard to the REFIT agenda: 
“I strongly believe the EU should not meddle in everything that happens in Europe” – yet 
that is precisely what it does in the context of European Economic Governance, especially 
in countries under the aegis of the troika.22 
 
Lastly, stakeholders were particularly disappointed by the failure of the Communication on 
Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU to fulfil the high expectations previously 
raised by Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion László Andor in a 
policy brief for the European Policy Centre, in which he proposed to introduce a European 
unemployment benefit scheme “potentially acting as an automatic fiscal stabiliser at the 
EMU level, helping to offset the weakening (if not disappearance) of national automatic 
stabilisers resulting from the sovereign debt crisis.” In the final event though this proposal 
did not feature in the Communication. Andor also acknowledged in the policy brief that 
labour mobility could not effectively alleviate high unemployment. This caused further 
disappointment because the Communication's proposals suggest the contrary.23 
 
This begs the question, why did the European Commission decide to meet the urgent need 
for a stronger social dimension of the EMU with such an unambitious Communication, and 
with proposals that were already contradicted by the European Commission itself on the 
very day they were announced? It appears as if the EU and its Institutions are not sincere in 
their commitment to alleviate the strained situation in which many member states and their 
social systems find themselves. Some observers suggest that the European Commission is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 José Manuel Barroso, Wir brauchen keine EU-Regeln für Friseurinnen-Schuhe, interview by Rolf-Dieter 
Krause. Tagesschau, 2 Oct. 2013, http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/interview130.html (last accessed 16 
May 2014). 
22 Joshua Chaffin, “European Commission Chief Barroso Aims to Cut Red Tape,” Financial Times, 2 Oct. 
2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b887c272-2b7a-11e3-a1b7-00144feab7de.html#axzz31hhwckDD (last 
accessed 16 May 2014). 
23 László Andor, Developing the social dimension of a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 13 
Sept. 2013, Brussels: European Policy Centre Policy Brief. 
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instead pursuing an entirely different agenda, guided by neo-liberal principles seeking to 
alter the shape and form of member states' social and economic frameworks. One 
commentator expressed the belief that hidden behind the social language of the 
Communication is “a Trojan horse for Social Europe,”24 albeit with the consent of national 
governments. One explanation for this could be the relative decline of social democracy in 
recent years, and thus a negligence of the social democratic project. Nonetheless, Andor's 
non-paper and the fact that the European Commission responded with a Communication to 
address the social dimension, could also suggest a renewed interest in Social Europe.  
 
Research Question 
 
As the title of the Communication would suggest, there is already a social dimension of the 
EMU in place. One way to assess and analyse the content of this social dimension is 
through the mechanisms of European Economic Governance, specifically the CSRs as 
these provide an overview of the EU's reform priorities in member states in the aftermath 
of the crisis. CSRs have been issued since 2011 and a significant number of them address 
the area of social policy. This paper will conduct a qualitative content analysis of the CSRs 
for 2011, 2012 and 2013 to assess what the social policies under the aegis of European 
Economic Governance consist of, to what extent they are guided by social democratic or a 
neo-liberal principles, and if the underlying rationale changes over time. This will answer 
the main research question: Did the impact of the financial and economic crisis along 
with the renewed call for a stronger social dimension lead to a visible revival of Social 
Europe in EU policy-making? 
 
Theoretical Approach: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective of Hegemony 
 
Traditionally, theoretical approaches such as liberal intergovernmentalism and especially 
neo-functionalism sometimes tend to conceive European integration as a linear progression 
towards deeper integration, due to an underlying rationale which assumes that integration 
is essentially beneficial to member states and their respective national societies, thereby 
facilitating a self-perpetuating process.25 However, partially in response to the financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ronald Janssen, “A Trojan Horse For Social Europe,” Social Europe Journal, 17 Oct. 2013, 
http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/10/a-trojan-horse-for-social-europe/ (last accessed 16 May 2014). 
25 Andreas Bieler, “Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives and the 
Analysis of European Integration,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8:4 
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and economic crisis and in part as a result of developments that predated the crisis, it 
became increasingly evident that European integration in its current form is not universally 
beneficial, creating inequalities within and between member states. Politically, this is 
reflected in the electoral successes of many extremist and/or Euro-sceptic parties. 
Furthermore, while neo-functionalism can explain the intrusion of the EU in member 
states' social policy,26 it has limited scope to explain why the EU displays a particular set 
of policy preferences over others.  
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism would be a credible approach to assess to what extent it is 
member states blocking social policy, as was the case before the introduction of qualified 
majority voting. The narrow focus on national governments makes it unsuitable for the 
purpose of this paper, because liberal intergovernmentalism has a limited capacity to 
explain the influence of actors apart from national governments in order to determine 
policy preferences of the European Commission as a supranational institution.  
 
Academics too are increasingly concerned with the aggravated divergences within and 
between member states and display a growing interest in the hierarchy of winners and 
losers of European integration. This is marked by a visible revival of a range of Marxist 
materialist critique and other related approaches, notable examples by Thomas Piketty,27 
Thomas Fazi28 and Wolfgang Streeck29 received a degree of public attention, and deserve 
to be recognised here. Common threats in much of the crisis literature and exemplified by 
Piketty is the assessment that current levels of wealth distribution make the economic 
model unsustainable, thus evoking memories of Marx's prediction that capitalism is 
doomed to self destruct.30 Another notion is advanced by authors such as Fazi who 
perceive the current state of European integration as an elite project with a narrowly 
defined group of economic beneficiaries, and he ties his critique to broader social 
movements that have emerged in recent years to express popular discontent.31 Streeck 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2005): 514. 
26 Scott L. Greer, “Uninvited Europeanization: Neofunctionalism and the EU Health Policy,” Journal of 
European Public Policy 13:1 (2006). 
27 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MS and 
London, England: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). 
28 Thomas Fazi, The Battle For Europe: How an Elite Hijacked a Continent – and How We Can Take it Back 
(London: Pluto Press, 2014). 
29 Wolfgang Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus (Frankfurt: 
Adorno-Vorlesungen, 2012). 
30 Piketty, Capital. 
31 Fazi, Battle for Europe. 
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revived the tradition of the Neo-Marxist Frankfurt school, and finds that the EU served as a 
forum to bypass the groups on national level capable and determined to oppose the kind of 
neo-liberal project that constitutes European integration.32 However, Streeck's approach, 
drawing on the oppositional reading of the Frankfurt school has limited explanatory value 
in comprehending the potential for hegemonic change within institutions. Likewise, 
Piketty's assessment, based on statistical data, has similar shortcomings. Fazi provides 
prospective alternatives, illustrating the support of social movements and intellectuals for a 
social-democratic project, but does not provide insights as to what extent this kind of 
change may already have taken place within the institutions, which is the focus of this 
paper.  
 
The renewed interest in class and the socio-economic factors that create inequalities has 
prompted some academics to shift their attention from the mechanisms of European 
integration towards its content with a view of projected outcomes of what can be described 
as the social purpose of European integration.33 Gerassimos Moschonas attributes the 
incapacity of social democracy to assert itself in the policy-making of the EU in the 
relative weakness of political parties on the European level due to the inflexible nature of 
EU decision making, of what he termed functional conservatism, which locked EU policy-
making into a neo-liberal mode at a crucial moment, making it difficult for social 
democrats to reverse or alter the set course. The shortcoming of this approach is that it is 
limited to political parties as agents of change, and does not address the capacity of ideas 
to mobilise other actors, for example in civil society, or within institutions to facilitate a 
transformative shift in policy-making.34 
 
Other authors such as Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton 
advanced a historical materialist approach based on a neo-Gramscian perspective35 which 
endorses the concept of an open ended process that departs from a neo-functionalist and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit. 
33 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, “The Contradictions of ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’ and Europe’s Multi-Level 
Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits”, in Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal 
European Governance – From Lisbon to Lisbon, eds. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Jan Drahokoupil and Laura 
Horn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 22. 
34 Gerassimos Moschonas, “When Institutions Matter: the EU and the Identity of Social Democracy,” 
Renewal 17:2 (2009). 
35 Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was an Italian Marxist and leader of the Communist Party in Italy whose 
work in the 1920s and 30s was influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution and fascism in Italy. His experience 
in this context led him to depart from the teleological view of Marxist material dialectic, turning instead to a 
historical approach of ideas competing for hegemony within a given society. 
10 
	  
liberal intergovernmentalist deterministic view of a linear progression of European 
integration, as well as the oppositional reading and economic determinism of Marxist-
materialist approaches. Instead, they focus on the struggle between competing ideas and 
classes to shape the content of European integration.36 This view is based on Antonio 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony. While Gramsci limited his analysis to national societies, 
his view was first brought into the realm of international relations by Robert Cox,37 who 
established a concept of hegemony that found recognition in the field of International 
Political Economy. In turn, it served as a foundation for academics applying a neo-
Gramscian approach in the study of European integration, where it was established by the 
so-called Amsterdam School of International Political Economy,38 and further developed 
by Bieler and Morton.39 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the social dimension of the EMU is best approached from a 
neo-Gramscian perspective, because its concept of hegemony lends itself in particular to 
the analysis of how two competing ideas – in this case, neo-liberalism and social 
democracy – manifest themselves in the policy-making of the European Union. In addition, 
the neo-Gramscian perspective, similar to Open Marxism, is historically conscious, 
departing from the dialectic determinism of Marx and acknowledging the possibility of 
alternative outcomes. Taking account of the historical evolution of the current hegemonic 
idea and its challengers, the neo-Gramscian approach allows to draw conclusions 
concerning the possible future of the EU's policy preferences following the financial and 
economic crisis and thus to estimating the nature of European integration in the near future, 
which will help to answer the research question.40 
 
Hegemony is by far the most important legacy of Gramscian thought, and has been 
interpreted in various ways, often adjusting to the historical socio-political conjunctures 
they intend to explain. Peter Thomas identified four prevalent interpretations of Gramsci's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Andreas Bieler, “The struggle over EU Enlargement: a Historical Materialist Analysis of European 
Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 9:4 (2002): 576-578. 
37 Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millenium – 
Journal of International Studies 12 (June 1983). 
38 Laura Horn, “Organic Intellectuals at Work? The High Level Group of Company Law Experts in European 
Corporate Governance Regulation,” in Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance. 
39 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and 
Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” Capital and Class 82 (Spring 
2004). 
40 Bieler, Class Struggle. 
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hegemony.41 
 
The first interpretation argues that a dominant social class establishes its hegemony by 
building a historic bloc that can utilise the resources at its disposal, including institutions, 
to exert a cultural and ideological integration over other groups, thereby applying 
leadership through consent to achieve the social purpose of the given hegemonic project. 
The second interpretation sees in hegemony the process of unifying heterogeneous political 
views in a composite socio-political body. The difference of this interpretation to the 
previous one lies in its focus on reconciliation of ideas, rather than dominance and 
subordination. The third interpretation views hegemony as a “form of anti-politics” which 
undermines existing structures of rule. Finally, the fourth interpretation places Gramsci in 
accord with the traditional realist interpretation of hegemony as a struggle for power in a 
geo-political context.42 
 
In the following this paper will utilise the first interpretation as it is best suited for the 
intention of examining the hegemonic relationship of ideas to mobilise institutions, in this 
case the European Commission. Following this interpretation, the neo-Gramscian concept 
of hegemony departs from the traditional International Relations perspective of a state-
centric view of hegemony in which power relations determine the hegemonic order. 
Instead of brute force or the threat of it, the neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony 
implies class hegemony within a society, based on ideas and the power of communicating 
and persuading other groups of their respective hegemonic order. This often happens in a 
dialectical fashion with contested and open-ended outcomes. 
 
It is important to note here that class is not understood as a uniform and coherent group, 
but is rather determined by what is called the social relations of production. These are not 
merely limited to production in the economic sense, but entail “the production and 
reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are 
prerequisites to the production of physical goods”.43 As such, it is “encompassing the 
totality of social relations in material, institutional and discursive forms that engender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Peter D. Thomas, “Hegemony, Passive Revolution and the Modern Prince,” Thesis Eleven 117:20 (Aug. 
2013). 
42 Ibid., 21-22. 
43 Quoted in Bieler and Morton, “A Critical Theory Route”, 89. 
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particular social forces.”44 Therefore, class cannot be divided into neat categories such as 
capital and labour, although this can, and often does play a crucial role. Further, the neo-
Gramscian perspective finds that class struggle does not just take place between labour and 
capital, but also between different forms of capital and labour, on a national and 
international level. For example, van Apeldoorn45 and Guglielmo Carchedi illustrate the 
struggle between different national capitals to promote their vision of the EMU vis-à-vis 
each other.46 Another reason for struggle between different forms of capital and labour can 
be attributed to different production structures, for example between finance capital and 
industrial capital,47 but also between national and transnational production sectors, as 
suggested by van Apeldoorn's analysis of transnational capital,48 and Bieler's comparative 
study of the responses of British and Swedish trade unions respectively to the introduction 
of the EMU.49 
 
Another important concept to understand hegemony in neo-Gramscian thought is, as Cox 
explains, the important distinction between “dominance implying dictatorship and 
direction implying leadership”. In turn, Cox's understanding of hegemony entails direction, 
and the ability of hegemonic class to align other classes and groups within society with 
their own goals or to make concessions in order to make the hegemonic structures more 
acceptable. Gramsci applied this concept to the capitalist hegemonies of Northern Europe, 
where he found that such concessions allowed for the development of social democracy 
without calling into question the hegemonic structures or the basic principles underlying 
these structures.50 Further, acknowledging this ability of the hegemonic class to build a 
dominant coalition allowed him to depart from the economic determinism of Marx by 
acknowledging the “reciprocal relationship of the political, ethical and ideological spheres 
of activity with the economic sphere,” and lending greater importance to the interplay of 
economism and idealism.51 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid., 87. 
45 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
46 Guglielmo Carchedi “The EMU, Monetary Crises, and the Single European Currency,” Capital and Class 
63 (Autumn 1997). 
47 Bieler, Class Struggle, 516-17. 
48 Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism. 
49 Andreas Bieler, “Labour and the Struggle over the Future European Model of Capitalism: British and 
Swedish Trade Unions and their Positions on EMU and European Co-operation,” Political Studies 
Association 10 (2008). 
50 Cox, “Gramsci”, 163-166 
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The relevance of Gramsci's concept of hegemony for International Relations and European 
integration studies lies in the capacity to avoid reductionism and accommodate instead the 
possibility for alternative outcomes when different ideas compete for hegemony. To do so, 
the challenging social class must form what Gramsci calls a historic bloc that can bring 
together a dominant coalition of actors who accept an idea and can support it with the 
material, moral and institutional resources at their disposal.52 While Gramsci limited his 
application of hegemony to the national level, Cox advanced the notion that they can 
transcend national boundaries when this happens: “the economic and social institutions, 
the culture, the technology associated with the national hegemony become patterns for 
emulation abroad.”53 Intellectuals also form an important element of such an historic bloc 
often by articulating and fostering consent on a particular world view thus constituting 
what Gramsci termed organic intellectuals connected to the interests of the hegemonic 
project, often with close links to the elites that shape this project.54 Laura Horn provides a 
concrete example of this on hand of expert group consultation in the EU. Horn found that 
an expert group was able to direct European Commission policy making on company law 
and corporate governance to “shift towards a more market-based corporate governance 
regulation.”55 Thus organic intellectuals “play a crucial role in formulating and spreading 
the ideological and strategic concepts of any given political project,”56 in this case that of 
neo-liberalism.  
 
The Amsterdam school of international political economy applied the neo-Gramscian 
perspective to the study of European integration. Van Apeldoorn described the contest 
between member states' national capitals and the European multinational capitals over 
which form and shape the neo-liberal hegemony would take.57 Guglielmo Carchedi took a 
similar approach,58 and Bieler found that “neo-liberalism can be understood as the 
hegemonic project of transnational European capital.”59 Bieler's interest lies in particular 
with the ability of alternative ideas to compete with the neo-liberal hegemony and their 
potential to form a historic bloc. His research focuses in particular on the role of trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Bieler and Morton, “A Critical Theory Route”. 
53 Cox, “Gramsci”, 171. 
54 Agustí Nieto-Galan, “Antonio Gramsci Revisited: Historians of Science, Intellectuals, and the Struggle for 
Hegemony,” History of Science 49 (2011): 458. 
55 Horn, “Organic Intellectuals at Work?,” 125. 
56 Ibid., 130. 
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unions as part of social movements and as agents of a social democratic hegemonic 
project.60 
 
When Bieler further developed the concept of competing hegemonies to the process of 
European Integration, he identified three competing projects that sought to determine the 
social purpose of European integration in general and the Internal Market in particular. 
According to him, neo-liberalism was the predominant hegemony during the 1980s, when 
it was challenged by a neo-mercantilist, as well as a social democratic project in the late 
1980s and 1990s, before gaining the upper hand again in the 2000s to remain so to date.61 
The general consent in the literature appears to be that the tentative outcome of this 
ongoing struggle is the predominance of neo-liberal hegemony.       
 
In summary, the neo-Gramscian perspective has the capacity to detect hegemonic power 
relations and their change over time. Under the assumption established in the literature that 
European integration is primarily driven by a historic bloc of actors guided by neo-liberal 
principles, this paper will assess the impact of the financial and economic crisis on the 
predominance of this hegemony and determine if the crisis led to a revival of the social 
democratic project, and if so if this may be reflected in EU policy-making. In particular, 
this paper will focus on the capacity of the historic bloc to mobilise institutions, in this case 
the European Commission, for their own hegemonic project.  
 
Methodology: Qualitative Content Analysis of the CSRs 
 
In order to assess the direction of EU policy-making in the context of European Economic 
Governance, this paper will conduct a qualitative content analysis of the CSRs, which are 
an integral part of the European Semester and European Economic Governance. The CSRs 
have been formulated each year by the European Commission and subsequently confirmed 
and issued by the Council of the EU since 2011. They are particularly relevant to the 
analysis of hegemonic order because all member states are liable to receive them 
regardless of exceptional circumstances, for example countries that are subject to 
Economic Adjustment Programmes, which regulate the reforms and conditions under 
which member states receive bailouts. As such, CSRs do not necessarily correspond to 	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severe economic developments that call for corrective intervention, but constitute instead 
institutional policy preferences that are conveyed to national governments by the European 
Commission with the consent of the Council of the EU. The following assessment will 
comprise all CSRs issued from 2011 to 2013, to all EU member states except Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal, which did not receive recommendations in 2013 to avoid 
redundancies because these countries were already subject to more comprehensive 
memoranda of understanding, as a condition for financial bailouts. Likewise, the 
recommendations for Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Romania in 2011 as well as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania in 2012 simply urge compliance with measures set 
out in the memoranda of understanding without providing further recommendations. 
Furthermore, the Euro area received a common set of CSRs that concern elements of 
supranational policy coordination.  
 
Categories and Themes of Analysis  
 
Researchers of the European Trade Union Institute have already conducted a quantitative 
content analysis to assess the total number of CSRs that address social policy, and 
classified categories within social policy recommendations.62 This paper, however, will 
introduce a different set of categories relevant, but not explicitly limited to social policy in 
order to conduct a qualitative content analysis capable of answering the research question 
if the impact of the crisis led to a visible revival of Social Europe in EU policy-making. 
The categories for the purpose of this paper are 1. fiscal policy, 2. structural labour market 
reform, 3. labour activation measures, 4. education, 5. social inclusion, 6. the role of social 
partners, and 7. economic policy. Beyond the manifest content of these categories their 
qualitative analysis will make it possible to identify themes of latent content contained 
within these categories.63 The categories of manifest content are unlikely to undergo 
significant change over time enabling the replicability of the research to keep up with the 
annually issued CSRs, while the themes within these categories are likely to be susceptible 
to changing ideological tendencies, which will help to detect hegemonic change over time.  
 
The significance of the new mechanisms of European Economic Governance was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Christophe Degryse, Maria Jepsen and Philippe Pochet, The Euro Crisis and its Impact on National and 
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recognised by advocates of Social Europe and received a great deal of attention, for 
example from the research network European Social Observatory, and from the European 
Trade Union Institute. Researchers of the European Social Observatory such as Bart 
Vanhercke64, Rita Baeten and Sarah Thomson65 include the CSRs in their analysis of 
European Economic Governance and place their findings in the broader context of social 
developments and social policy in the EU. The European Trade Union Institute is equally 
concerned with the new processes of European Economic Governance and estimates that 
roughly 40 per cent of the CSRs address areas of social policy.66 
 
Accordingly, the CSRs constitute a relevant empirical gateway to the analysis of the 
European Commission social policy preference. In turn, this will make it possible to assess 
if this policy preference is guided by a sincere attempt to cater to the social democratic 
project of European integration, suggesting a counter hegemonic project, or if the CSRs are 
used to convey the neo-liberal hegemony's institutional vision of social policies and their 
role in the socio-economic fabric of member states. This in turn will help to answer the 
research question if the impact of the financial and economic crisis and the renewed call 
for a stronger social dimension led to a visible revival of Social Europe in EU policy-
making. 
 
Economic and Social Policy Models Defined 
 
In addition, this paper will have to define and operationalise neo-liberalism and social 
democracy in terms of themes in their outlook on both social and economic policy-making, 
to determine how these policies correlate to their individual hegemonic projects. It is 
worthwhile to begin by outlining the associated economic principles that serve as an 
underlying rationale for other policy areas including social policy. This will be followed by 
a definition of their respective social policy models. Economic neo-liberalism in its current 
form is essentially a product of the research of the economists Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich Hayek. Their school of thought lent credibility to an alternative to the theories of 
Maynard Keynes whose Keynesian school of thought dominated economic policy in the 	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aftermath of the Second World War until the arrival of neo-liberalism in the 1980s. 
Keynesianism was essential to the social democratic project of many states, pursuing goals 
such as full employment and alleviating the worst forms of poverty. According to the work 
of Dag Einar Thorsen and Amund Lie, the teachings of Friedman and Hayek shifted the 
emphasis of economic policy to a monetarist approach with the goal of price stability. 
Other connotations entailed in their view of neo-liberalism are a minimum of state 
intervention and a fairly radical laissez-faire approach to the market as result of a firm 
belief in market mechanisms.  
 
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, the intellectual groundwork of Friedman and Hayek 
demonstrates the importance of intellectuals in the formation of a historic bloc that is 
capable of challenging and replacing an existing hegemonic order with a different set of 
ideas.  
 
Currently, neo-liberalism covers a wide range of normative foundations. At one end of the 
spectrum, some forms of neo-liberalism reject the state altogether, thus departing quite 
drastically from classic economic liberalism, while other strands more closely resemble 
classic liberalism's attitude towards the state's role as a prerequisite to enable the market to 
function. Most strands of neo-liberalism however are placed somewhere in between these 
extremes and share some common features including a degree of scepticism towards the 
state and the belief that its role and functions ought to be reduced to a minimum. Often, the 
desired main task of the state is seen to be the safeguarding of free markets, free trade and 
strong property rights. Generally, neo-liberalism attributes a great deal of responsibility to 
the individual for economic success or failure, thereby making overt social inequality 
morally acceptable.67 
 
It is the latter position on individual responsibility that invited a great deal of controversy, 
as critics argue that it ignores structural obstacles to an individual's economic success, for 
example in form of access to institutional or financial resources and the like. Some critical 
authors such as Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston find that this leads to the 
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of elite groups.68 However, other critical 
voices go so far as to use the phrase as “a generic term of depreciation, describing any 	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of Oslo (2007). 
68 Ibid., 8. 
18 
	  
economic and political development deemed to be undesirable.”69 
Below, neo-liberal and social democratic premises will be further operationalised in order 
to apply them to the CSRs, which are comprised of seven relevant policy areas for the 
current discussion on Social Europe mentioned above. 
 
Based on the work of Thorsen and Lie, the neo-liberal economic policy model for the 
purpose of this paper, is defined as policies that aim at encouraging individual 
responsibility and liability, reducing state intervention, apart from those interventions that 
enable market functioning, as well as labour market flexibility, and an emphasis on market 
mechanisms. After all, neo-liberal policies rely heavily on the ability to mobilise policy-
makers to pursue the kind of state withdrawal in certain areas, while strengthening it in 
others. As Michael Krätke explains, Grasmci found that politics and economics could not 
be separated, so that “the free market and liberal market-economy is a 'regulation' of a 
statal nature, introduced and maintained by means of law and compulsion.”70 Therefore, 
neo-liberalism is not so much about rejecting state regulation, but about making it serve the 
interests of economic elites. This will be particularly relevant as regards sections 2. on 
structural labour market reform and section 7. on economic policy.  
 
Furthermore, the ultimate rationale for neo-liberal fiscal policy is to ensure fiscal 
consolidation and price stability.  In contrast, social democratic economic policy model 
tends to pay a great deal of attention to social equality and redistribution, as well as 
Keynesian policies of state induced investment.71 This theme will be relevant in section 1. 
dealing with fiscal policy. 
 
Turning to social policy, there is currently ample variety across member states in absence 
of an ambitious common social policy model that would be comparable to other policy 
areas e.g. the common market, or the monetary union. Despite the social dimension 
established in the Treaty and the partial implementation of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of Workers and accompanying Social Action Programme,72 the 
current EU's social policy consists primarily of the coordination of social indicators and the 	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sharing of best practice between member states.73 In absence of a common European social 
policy model, national models will have to serve as ideal types, which will be used as a 
yardstick to assess if the European Commission indicates a policy preference for one 
model over another within the CSRs.   
 
The literature establishes a variety of categories to define different social policy 
preferences in Europe. Three models in particular tend to emerge consistently: the liberal, 
the Conservative and the social democratic model, as identified by Gøsta Esping-Anderson. 
In addition, a number of authors have advanced further categories such as the 
Mediterranean model, a social democratic/liberal hybrid model, and the East European or 
New Europe model to describe the social policy models of the EU's newer member 
states.74 
 
Although all of these above mentioned categories are insightful and well justified, this 
paper will rely entirely on the three categories identified by Esping-Anderson as they are 
consistently established in the literature and provide ideal types, whereas the other models 
tend to constitute some form of hybrid model. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the categories are defined as follows, based on the work of 
Rutauskiene: The liberal social policy model is founded on market principles and minimal 
state intervention limited to the most marginalised social groups that are incapable of 
caring for themselves. This will be an important theme to note in section 3. on labour 
activation measures, and generally stands in contrast to the Conservative model, which is 
often linked to employment based social contributions, as well as to the social democratic 
model, which is based on universal rights that comprise access to a range of benefits and 
services. Another common theme of the liberal model is the provision of a minimum 
income through social assistance.75 Further, Rutauskiene established that the liberal model 
refrains from regulating family policy and equal rights while demonstrating a policy 
preference for private sector solutions a system often exemplified by the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.76 This model is also reflective of the neo-liberal project and policy 
recommendations based on this model or giving preference to it can be classified as neo-	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liberal. 
 
The Conservative social policy model, also referred to as the Bismarckian-, or 
Continental model, is a needs-based approach based on compulsory social contributions 
with moderate levels of social provisions, usually linked to employment. This system is 
often based on a mixture of private and public providers, encourages social dialogue 
between employers and employees, labour market activation and qualification raising 
measures, as well as traditional family organisation and gender roles, generally 
exemplified by countries such as France and Germany.77 This category occupies a middle 
ground between the other two models, with sometimes fluid boundaries. CSRs that fall into 
this category will be further assessed in terms of a possible hegemonic dominance where 
applicable, based on the definition of social democracy and neo-liberalism.   
 
Finally, the social democratic social policy model entails far reaching state intervention 
to guarantee strong social rights and social protection, based on social solidarity with the 
ultimate goal of social justice and equality. This system is marked by a high level of state 
spending and actively promotes gender equality, supported by the provision of childcare 
and other social services. This will be relevant in section 3. on labour activation measures 
and section 5. social inclusion. The social democratic model is most commonly associated 
with Scandinavia, but also Belgium. CSRs that fall into this category are classified as 
social democratic.  
 
A common theme in both, the Conservative and the social democratic model tends to be a 
strong social partnership which serves as a forum to manage industrial relations, as will be 
discussed in section 2. on structural labour market reform and section on 6. the role of 
social partners. 
In the following, the three models will provide a framework by which to classify and 
discuss the CSRs along ideological lines in order to assess if the European Commission 
gives preference to one model or another in its recommendations. This in turn will 
determine if social democratic or neo-liberal hegemony is prevalent in the formulation of 
the CSRs and in the European Commission as an institution.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid. 
21 
	  
The CSRs 
 
The CSRs issued each year by the European Commission since 2011 as part of European 
Economic Governance address a number of policy areas.78 The recommendations are often 
formulated in what can be described as a package recommendation that touch on a number 
of different policy areas. In order to make them more accessible for analysis and discussion, 
they will be grouped into seven policy categories that focus on different aspects of the 
CSRs with direct or indirect implications on member states' social policies. As stated 
above, the chosen categories are 1. fiscal policy, 2. structural labour market reform, 3. 
labour activation measures, 4. education, 5. social inclusion, 6. the role of social partners, 
as well as the last category 7. economic policy, which includes a range of market oriented 
measures that have at best indirect implications for social policies, but are necessary to 
complete the overview of the CSRs, providing an additional dimension to assess the 
predominance of one hegemonic project over another. 
 
Due to their package format, the content of the CSRs is not easily quantifiable, especially 
as the wording is often ambiguous e.g. some CSRs call for more cost efficiency in the 
health care sector, whereas others refer simply to public services, without formally 
mentioning health care but with potential implications for the health care sector 
nonetheless. Therefore, this paper will take a qualitative approach to assess the scope and 
implications of the CSRs on member states policy-making. It is also evident that a number 
of recommendations address social policy, which is an area formally reserved for the 
national level of governance. 
 
Another feature of the CSRs is a remarkable level of consistency in a number of the 
European Commission's policy priorities over the last three years, while other priorities 
seem to have changed over time, and new priorities emerged altogether. Lastly, it is 
important to note that the members states which are subject to memoranda of 
understanding, the so-called programme countries, only received recommendations to 
comply with the more detailed and extensive agreements they reached with their partners 
such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund for 2011 and 2012, while the European Commission did not issue CSRs 	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can be found in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
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for these countries in 2013. They are therefore not included in the following analysis.  
 
 Not to examine the policy recommendations in programme countries could be viewed as a 
potential shortcoming. However, the special nature and often extensive scope of reform in 
programme countries constitutes an extreme variant of European Commission policy 
recommendation, and would distort the analysis in the sense that it does not fall neatly in 
line with the overall policy preference of the European Commission, which is the primary 
focus of this study. 
 
In the section below, the CSRs will be assessed in terms of their applicability to the two 
economic and three social policy models, along with initial analysis, followed by a 
discussion in which the findings are placed in the context of neo-Gramscian perspective in 
order to answer the research question.     
  
Findings and Analysis 
1. Fiscal Policy   
 
Fiscal consolidation is certainly one of the most prominent and consistent priorities of the 
European Commission's recommendations, which is in line with and refers to the Stability 
and Growth Pact. This is a procedure, which monitors and issues corrective measures to 
assure that member states' public deficit does not exceed three per cent of GDP and public 
debt does not exceed 60 per cent of GDP. Since the 2011 reform called Six Pack the 
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact have been 
consolidated under the umbrella of the European Semester, and include financial sanctions 
against member states which breach the parameters of the agreement. The Six Pack reform 
was further complimented by the so-called Two Pack in 2013 for even closer surveillance 
of Euro area member states.79 Accordingly, all member states received recommendations 
that address this policy goal. In addition annually sixteen to seventeen countries received 
additional recommendations concerning age related expenditure. 
 
The CSRs tend to take a dual approach to fiscal consolidation, usually promoting short-
term expenditure cuts and reform of pension and retirement systems in order to enhance 
long term sustainability of public finances. Notably, the recommendations emphasise the 	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expenditure side over the income side in 2011 and 2012, but begin to encourage measures 
to reinforce tax compliance and the fight against tax evasion as of 2012 and more so in 
2013. Although this move to reinforce tax compliance and fighting tax evasion constitutes 
a qualitative shift towards the income side of public finance, the overall emphasis 
continues to lie with the expenditure side. In this context, the European Commission often 
recommends improving the cost efficiency of public services and health care. To do so in 
these areas is not necessarily contrary to the goals of the social democratic model, but the 
single-minded focus on fiscal consolidation can put the welfare state as a whole on the 
defensive in such crucial areas.  
 
In order to achieve compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, Austria, Belgium and 
France for example placed caps on the growth of health expenditure. Spain already 
reduced its health care expenditure by eight per cent, and is expected to achieve additional 
savings. Other countries too, have pursued reform in the health care sector with a view to 
curbing expenditure, e.g. by optimising pharmaceutical spending.80 
 
 This is especially the case in 2013 when a total of ten member states received 
recommendations explicitly suggesting they increase cost efficiency in health care, up 
from four countries in 2011 and 2012, while others received recommendations on cost 
efficiency of public spending in general, which can have indirect implications for health 
care and social spending as well. The way in which the European Commission phrases its 
recommendations establishes a policy hierarchy in which public services and health care 
are viewed as a cost variable in which the health outcomes and accessibility to services are 
sometimes side-lined.  
 
Likewise, the European Commission recommends curbing age related expenditures “to 
ensure long-term sustainability of public finances”81 for sixteen member states in 2011 and 
2012 and seventeen member states in 2013. In order to do so, the European Commission 
refers to measures such as reform of the pension systems, raising effective retirement age, 
linking the statutory retirement age to gains in life expectancy, aligning the retirement age 
of men and women, phasing out early exit pathways, encouraging private pension savings, 	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81 CSRs Malta 2013. 
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and containing expenditure on long term care. To make these outcomes possible, the 
European Commission also gives auxiliary recommendations to improve access to long 
term-care services by shifting care provisions from institutional care to home care, and 
increasing the employability of older workers to enable them to stay in the labour force 
longer.  
 
Fiscal consolidation and austerity constitute a major premise of neo-liberal thought and are 
often challenging the provision of services envisioned by the social democratic welfare 
state. In the EU context, fiscal consolidation has been a key component of the European 
Commission's economic crisis response which is assumed to require deficit reduction and 
price stability as a prerequisite for economic recovery. To neo-liberals, one of the most 
important and most effective measures for deficit reduction is cutbacks in public 
expenditure and in turn, on public services and welfare provisions. In other words, neo-
liberalism prescribes austerity as a way out of an economic crisis and as a guarantee for 
long-term economic sustainability. This can sometimes also affect social protection at 
times when it is most needed, and stands in sharp contrast to Keynesians, who argue that 
deficit reduction should not be pursued before economic recovery is stable and secure. 
This is under the Keynesian assumption that cuts in public spending and welfare spending 
at a time of economic downturn or crisis will lead to reduced levels of consumption and to 
a downward spiral of consumer demand that will prolong a crisis and compound its 
effects.82 
 
In their research on the broader context of health care reform in Europe, Rita Baeten and 
Sarah Thomson assessed the implications of such policy recommendations and concur with 
De Ruijter and Hervey who conclude “that the Commission is using economic actors and 
institutional mechanisms such as the DG Ecfin and the Ecofin Council configuration [the 
Directorate General of the European Commission and Council of the EU configuration 
responsible for economic and financial policy], where EU competence is less contested, to 
communicate and progress its policies on health care, an area in which it does not have 
competence.”83 Further, Baeten and Thomson suggest that “the financial crisis created a 
window of opportunity for the EU to claim greater legitimacy to influence this domain of 
national competency,” which they claim is “something that had been on the Commission’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Andrew Gamble, “Debt and Deficit: The Quest for Economic Competence,” in After the Third Way, eds. 
Olaf Cramme and Patrick Diamond (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 51-53. 
83 Quoted in Baeten and Thomson, “Health Care Policies.” 
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political agenda for a long time.” They find that this “is now a precedent for the EU to 
intervene directly in national health policy,”84 presumably, in order to penetrate the sphere 
of member states' social policy, where the historic bloc around the neo-liberal project had 
not managed to extend its reach to the same extent as in other policy areas. 
 
When comparing the CSRs on Fiscal consolidation with the definition of the different 
social policy models in the EU brought forth by Rutauskiene and adopted in this paper, the 
measures suggested by the European Commission show some signs of the Conservative 
model, for example by calling on a mixture of private and public providers in long-term 
care and for increased efficiency in public services. In addition, the recommendations 
strongly favour the liberal model in that they suggests cut backs in public expenditure, 
thereby reducing the capacity of the state to intervene, and promote market solutions over 
state provisions, e.g. as in the case of Malta where the European Commission suggests to 
“encourage private pension savings.”85 Although, the recommendations on long-term care 
which suggest shifting care from institutional to home care correlate with the premises of 
the Conservative model, they constitute a qualitative shift in the liberal direction, with 
potential outcomes that are contrary to the social democratic model, because they imply 
two areas that affect women's employment and thereby gender equality. Firstly, caring 
responsibilities tend over proportionately to fall on women, often forcing them to withdraw 
from the labour force, and secondly, professional home care services tend to be a low wage 
sector in which abuses of employee rights are difficult to trace, making the sector prone to 
exploitation.86 
 
2. Structural Labour Market Reform  
 
Another area where the European Commission displays a strong vigour in promoting 
change is structural labour market reform. The efforts in this area can be further subdivided 
into four themes: labour legislation and employment protection, wage formation, taxation 
on labour, and to a lesser degree labour mobility.  
 
One area in which the European Commission's priorities shifted somewhat in the time 	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period between 2011 and 2013 is in its approach to labour legislation and employment 
protection. In 2011 several countries including France, Italy, Lithuania were advised to 
review legislation, including employment protection, dismissal rules, labour market 
flexibility, and the use of fixed-term contracts. The European Commission also asked 
Slovenia, to align rights and obligations of permanent and fixed-term contracts. In addition, 
the Czech Republic was advised to make better use of part-time and flexible work for 
families with children. 
 
In 2012, France and the Netherlands received recommendations regarding employment 
protection and labour market rigidities, while Cyprus is supposed to promote self-
employment and Lithuania flexible work arrangements. Labour market flexibility is 
sometimes thought of as beneficial to employees, as atypical work arrangements can 
sometimes accommodate individual requirements such as those of parents with children. 
However, flexibility often only applies to the needs of employers, such as in the case of 
zero-hour contracts, often used in the health care sector in the United Kingdom. Under the 
conditions of such contracts, employees are not guaranteed a minimum number of working 
hours, making their income uncertain and subject to fluctuations or failure to receive pay at 
all. Not infrequently the practice puts employees in a continuous state of on-call alert that 
entails workers waking up in the morning, getting ready for work, and waiting for a call to 
go to work for an undefined number of hours, and sometimes no hours at all at the 
discretion of the employer.87 
 
While the main thrust of these policies is geared towards loosening legislation on industrial 
relations in favour of employers, Poland was the first country whose CSRs for 2012 
addressed social concerns connected to labour legislation in order “to combat in-work 
poverty, limit the excessive use of civil law contracts.”88 In-work poverty describes a 
situation in which wages are so low that a person's income from paid labour is not 
sufficient to provide for one's means of subsistence. The shift towards concern for in-work 
poverty was even more evident in 2013 when France, Germany, Poland and Slovenia were 
compelled to address similar issues such as interim work in France, and “the transition 
from non-standard forms of employment such as mini-jobs into more sustainable forms of 	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employment” in Germany.89 On the other hand Lithuania, Malta and the Netherlands 
continued to receive recommendations more in line to the ones from 2011 and 2012, 
strengthening the position of employers. 
 
While atypical employment is undeniably on the rise across Europe as part of a global 
trend, sometimes described as precarity,90 in the final event it is policy makers who decide 
to promote it without questioning or critically assessing the various forms of flexible 
employment in terms of their social implications. In the case of the CSRs it appears that 
the European Commission generally promotes this type of arrangement, only to reverse the 
worst excesses in select instances such as civil law contracts in Poland and improving 
transition from mini-jobs to other forms of employment in Germany, yet, to date no such 
recommendation has been issued for example to the United Kingdom with regard to zero-
hour contracts.     
 
In terms of wages and wage formation, the European Commission consistently issued 
recommendations in 2011 to all member states that have a automatic wage indexation 
system, which serves to protect low-income households from the increases in the cost of 
living due to inflation, “to take steps to reform... the system of wage bargaining and wage 
indexation to ensure that wage growth better reflects developments in labour productivity 
and competitiveness.”91 Countries that received this recommendation or one with 
equivalent wording included Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Spain. In addition, 
Italy was encouraged to reform its collective bargaining framework and together with 
Spain is meant to decentralise collective bargaining and enable local and firm-level 
bargaining, which is sometimes associated with a weakened bargaining position of trade 
unions and leads to greater divergences in pay and working conditions.92 Further, France in 
2011 and Slovenia in 2013 received recommendations to “ensure that minimum wage is 
supportive of job creation,”93 and the call to align wages with productivity was extended to 
Bulgaria in 2011, as well as to Finland, Germany, and Slovenia in 2013.  
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In some cases such as Germany, the European Commission's aim is indeed to raise wages 
in light of stagnation, despite productivity gains in recent years. Nonetheless, the overall 
implications of the European Commission wage policy preferences lead to divergences 
within and between member states, potentially facilitating the development of a dual track 
European economy and appearing to be a shift towards a neo-liberal model in which wages 
are reduced to an expenditure item, while social cohesion and equality based on fair 
income distribution in the social democratic sense is being abandoned in favour of business 
interests.  
The fact that the European Commission is concerned with wage formation indicates the 
intent to consolidate neo-liberal monetarist policy, which is a requirement to ensure price 
stability as envisaged by neo-liberalism, as well as a consequence of the Monetary Union, 
which deprived member states of external monetary devaluation as an economic 
adjustment mechanism, forcing them to rely on internal devaluation in the form of wage 
devaluation and labour flexibility.94 
 
Partially as a consequence of the European Commission's recommendations, as well as 
other developments at the national and European level, low wages are increasingly 
becoming a component of some member states' economic fabric, especially were 
productivity is relatively low. They can sometimes even replace innovation as a means to 
gaining competitive advantage in the absence of external devaluation mechanisms.95 
 
Another set of CSRs that responds to this development and further encourages employers 
to hire low paid labour is the recommendation to reduce the high taxation on labour and 
high social contributions and to shift taxation to other areas such as environmental tax and 
value added tax on consumption instead. In 2011, seven countries received 
recommendations in this regard and in 2012 this number increased to fourteen, and thirteen 
in 2013. The European Commission claims that this will be beneficial to job creation, in 
particular for low skilled workers and in the low wage sector. In practice however, this 
recommendation undermines the financial sustainability of the social democratic model 
and is effectively substituting employers for paying low wages similar to the mini job 
scheme in Germany that is becoming subject of emulation abroad in countries such as 
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Spain,96 and was also considered in the United Kingdom.97 
 
Mini-jobs were part of the German Social Democratic Party's Agenda 2010, and in turn 
part of their Third Way politics that accepted the ideological hegemony of neo-
liberalism.98 As the German example illustrates, the pay in this area is often below living 
wage, currently 450 EUR a month in the case of a mini job, making the recipient 
dependent on social transfers, further straining social systems and making the state an 
agent of capital welfare subsidising business' labour costs. Accordingly, employers' 
organisations such as the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (UEAPME), promote minimum income schemes, reducing social contributions, 
shifting taxation from labour to other areas and even propose to “grant companies some 
financial incentives to give them [disadvantaged people] a job opportunity.”99 The concept 
of a means tested minimum income based on social protection is a common feature of the 
neo-liberal model,100 and the implicit promotion of work patterns like this make social 
assistance increasingly necessary across Europe, while undermining its funding, 
constituting a qualitative shift in a neo-liberal direction at the EU level.  
 
The approach also stands in conflict with the Conservative model that is largely based on 
mandatory social contributions, as removing burden of such contributions from employers 
undermines the basis of the Conservative model's funding. Lastly, the European 
Commission's suggestion to shift taxation to areas such as value added tax on consumption 
hit the low paid twice as hard as they spent the greatest share of their income on 
consumption, thereby carrying the brunt of the burden.101 This is particularly the case in 
Belgium, where the recommendations for 2013 advise to shift taxation to heating fuels.  
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Labour mobility has so far not been a major item on the European Commission's agenda, 
and only Italy and Belgium received recommendations accordingly to increase labour 
mobility across regions, while Poland was only encouraged to increase cross-sectoral 
labour mobility in 2013. In the context of bi-lingual Belgium, the lack of labour mobility 
can largely be attributed to linguistic and cultural differences, an issue that also continues 
to be an obstacle to labour mobility in the wider European context, posing a challenge to 
the European Commission's proposal to strengthen the social dimension of the EMU via a 
greater emphasis on mobility as an adjustment variable. Overall, it is also questionable 
whether labour mobility is a sustainable, or even desirable alternative to distorted 
economic development within and between member states, or if it is only likely to entrench 
such developments further.  
     
The CSRs concern for in-work poverty in some places could suggest social democratic 
considerations and the measures prescribed to e.g. Germany and Poland could be a 
challenge from, or concession to the social democratic model. However, the overall policy 
recommendations on wages and taxation on labour point in a different direction. The 
European Commission's wage policy challenges the notion that the social democratic 
project is gaining ground by, for example, promoting employment in the low wage sector. 
This illustrates the sometimes contradictory nature of the CSRs, as they appear to be 
concerned with social democratic priorities while implicitly promoting neo-liberalism at 
the same time. Neither do they challenge the basic premises of neo-liberal hegemony.   
 
One possible explanation for this could be internal struggles over policy hegemony that 
lead to inconclusive outcomes, or as Egbert Holthuis of the European Commission put it at 
a public panel discussion, “the result is a compromise.” However, overall direction points 
to a preference for neo-liberal policies and the result of this compromise was welcome by 
Thérèse de Liederkerke, Managing Director at the employer organisation 
BUSINESSEUROPE, who bluntly urged trade unions to accept the reduction of social 
standards,102 this suggests that elites, which can be associated with the neo-liberal 
hegemonic project, may have the capability to influence and mobilise institutional actors in 
their favour, thereby shaping European Commission policy preferences.  
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3. Labour Activation  
 
The high rate of unemployment across Europe makes labour activation policy another 
prominent item on the European Commission's agenda. The CSRs in this area appear to 
feature a policy outlook that is partially compatible with social democratic and neo-liberal 
social policy models respectively. Some aspects however, suggest the active dismantling of 
the Conservative model, in particular with regard to the Conservative family model.  
 
CSRs addressing labour activation were issued to fourteen countries in 2011, a number that 
increased to twenty-three in 2012 and twenty-five in 2013. In addition, the European 
Commission made recommendations to increase the availability of childcare at all stages 
of a child's development in line with the 2013 Barcelona targets,103 to increase workforce 
participation, especially of women in seven countries in 2011, eight in 2012 and nine in 
2013 consecutively. By increasing female workforce participation, the European 
Commission also attempts to foster gender equality and close the gender pay gap in line 
with the social democratic model, but contrary to the Conservative model, particularly with 
regard to family organisation. In addition, some countries such as Finland also received 
recommendations to extend working careers in order to align with gains in life expectancy 
and to assure long term labour supply. With regard to childcare, Jon Kvist's analysis 
suggests that the quantity of childcare has indeed increased in all but five countries that 
saw a reduction, while he suggests that the quality is likely to have suffered due to limited 
financial resources at a time of expanding services.104  
 
With regard to labour activation measures, the CSRs frequently suggest to reform and 
modernise employment services to “enhance their capacity to match skill profiles with 
labour market demand,”105 as well as “active labour market policies, including targeting 
measures on young people and the long-term unemployed.”106 The CSRs also advise better 
access to life long learning and other qualifying measures, which is essentially compatible 
with the social democratic model. This is the case in Germany where the CSRs 
consistently address the existing educational stratification and exclusiveness, which entails 
life long consequences, advising “to enhance participation in the labour market by 	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improving equitable access to education and training systems,”107 and to “raise educational 
achievements of disadvantaged groups.”108 However, the majority of CSRs place an 
emphasis on individual qualifications, for example “better matching young people's 
qualifications to labour demand.”109 In turn they place the responsibility for raising 
qualifications and skills singularly on the employee and the employment services in part 
relieving employers of their training responsibilities. This resonates with the definition of 
the neo-liberal model that encourages individual responsibility and liability, reduced state 
intervention, apart from those interventions that enable market functioning.  
 
This language implies that individual failure is responsible for unemployment, a view that 
is even more pronounced in 2012 when the European Commission recommends several 
countries to link unemployment benefits with active labour market policies or reducing the 
amount over time to erase disincentives to work. For example by advising, “to pursue the 
initiated reform of the unemployment benefit system to reduce disincentives to work,”110 
suggesting that high benefits are responsible, when it is often low pay rates that create the 
actual disincentives.111 
 
Similar reforms have been implemented in Germany in the early 2000s as part of the 
Agenda 2010 that also foresaw the revision of unemployment and social transfer payments. 
Although the example from Germany illustrates that the European Commission's view is 
shared by some academics and grounded in academic publications.112 These kinds of 
recommendations appear to be motivated by prejudice, with detrimental effects on those 
concerned. Indeed, empirical evidence, such as the research of Klaus Dörre and his 
colleagues, suggests that the measures to remove disincentives to work, as well as the 
intended activation measures tailored to the long-term unemployed and the so-called low 
skilled in fact lead to deteriorating employment outlooks and social status. Part of the 
problem is the combination of a subsidised minimum income and labour activation 
measures that compel workers to take on employment that does not pay a living wage, 
where they get caught up in a self-reinforcing cycle of low paid work and social transfers 	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but without the opportunity to make the transition to more stable employment. Yet, while 
the CSRs for Germany suggest taking steps to foster “the transition from non-standard 
forms of employment such as mini-jobs into more sustainable forms of employment,”113 
the recommendations for other countries described above promote precisely the 
combination of policies that led to the lack of opportunity and social stigma attached to 
mini-jobs. Further, they ignore that the number of individuals abusing the system is 
marginal compared to those that are seriously committed to finding employment, even 
where benefits are high.114 
 
An indication that CSRs in the area of labour activation are driven by neo-liberal 
considerations, is the fact that they correspond with the definition that state intervention 
should be limited to the most marginalised social groups that are incapable of caring for 
themselves, which stands in contrast to the social democratic model of strong universal 
social rights. Accordingly, the CSRs often refer to the “least qualified” and “most 
disadvantaged,”115 as well as disadvantaged groups such as Roma for example in Bulgaria, 
or immigrants in Sweden. 
 
Nevertheless, the CSRs make remarkable progress towards better addressing employers' 
role in training and enhancing qualifications by promoting apprenticeship schemes in six 
countries starting in 2012 and nine in 2013, up from one, Poland, in 2011. This mixed 
record of social democratic and neo-liberal recommendations could suggest competing 
currents within the policy-making of the European Commission, however with a strong 
aversion to the Conservative model in form of the recommendations on childcare, which is 
particularly relevant for countries such as Austria and Germany that are representative of 
the Conservative model.  
 
4. Education  
 
In the area of education CSRs can be grouped into three themes, one of which contains 
general recommendations on improving the quality of education, and reducing drop out 
rates. The second theme concerns Hungary and Germany, which received 	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recommendations to provide better access and opportunities to disadvantaged groups. 
More frequently though, CSRs of the third theme advise member states to match 
educational outcomes with labour market demand, which is in part related to the section 
above on labour activation.  
 
In addition, a number of CSRs advise to subject education to market mechanisms, 
expressing a clear preference for neo-liberalism and undermining the independence of the 
education system. Recommendations include tying performance to funding, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic which should “take targeted measures to support schools 
that rank low in educational outcomes,” albeit only primary and secondary schools, while 
the recommendation suggests to “increase the share of performance based funding of 
research institutions.”116 Making funding dependent on performance may increase the 
quality of select educational institutions, but it will inevitably create divisions between 
elite universities and the rest, possibly facilitating a two tier system with growing 
education inequalities, as is evident in countries where funding is already performance 
based. Such recommendations contain the connotation of bolstering select institutions by 
channelling funding to them, making them more attractive to a select strata of students, 
while many other institutions may deteriorate and will fall victim to market mechanisms – 
Something that is already visible as a result of the Bologna reforms, which were designed 
to align European systems of higher education with each other. Sybille Reichert 
highlighted the increasing importance of market mechanisms in higher education, where 
resulting from the Bologna process “institutional profiling and selectivity are given free 
reign… there are signs of institutions differentiating their mass and élite cohorts along 
bachelor's master's lines.” Likewise, the reforms are held responsible for the “erosion of 
academic freedom, egalitarian values and democratic culture” in countries such as Spain 
and France.117 
Education does not easily lend itself to a classification in terms of a social welfare model. 
Nevertheless, it is particularly relevant from a neo-Gramscian perspective, which pays 
great attention to the importance of organic intellectuals as part of a historic bloc.  Agustí 
Nieto-Galan found that:  
 
For Gramsci, if the educational system of a country surrenders docilely to industrial 	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demands, to the utilitarian rhetoric of immediate applicability, then we risk 
transforming our young students' greatest potential into grey automata, handmaiden 
of private interests. To avoid this, future professional training had to be open to the 
talent of each individual and not be limited to mechanically serving the interests of 
the market.118 
 
Subjecting the outcomes of higher education to the demands of the labour market could 
shackle academic freedom and make academics liable to social classes that are likely to be 
committed to the neo-liberal hegemonic project, thereby harnessing academics capacities 
in the support of this project.119 Accordingly the CSRs in this area imply the prevalence of 
a neo-liberal hegemony. 
 
5. Social Inclusion  
 
Social Inclusion, an area that tends to be associated with social democratic principles, did 
not feature prominently in the CSRs until 2012. In 2011 only two countries received 
related recommendations, Cyprus and the United Kingdom. The latter was advised to 
reform its housing market “with a view to alleviating problems of affordability and the 
need for state subsidy, for housing.”120 This is also one of the few CSRs that pursues the 
regulation of market mechanisms, which suggests a shift away from neo-liberal policies 
that often tend to pursue less regulation of market forces. With regard to Cyprus the CSRs 
advise to “accelerate implementation of the national health insurance system.”121 
 
In 2011, these recommendations stand in contrast to a somewhat misleading language that 
uses terms such as “social inclusion” to advance essentially neo-liberal policies. For 
example, Bulgaria received the advice “to address the challenge of combating poverty and 
promoting social inclusion,”122 while the European Commission suggests to do so solely 
via labour market activation measures as described above, including its premises of 
personal responsibility and focus on the most vulnerable groups without a claim to 
universality that would be expected from a policy recommendation with a social 
democratic rationale. Likewise, Cyprus was recommended “to address the high at-risk-of-
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poverty rate for the elderly,”123 under the pretext however, of curbing age related 
expenditure by, for example, extending the years of contribution on pensions, which would 
paradoxically increase the likelihood of failing to qualify, and thus increase the at-risk-of-
poverty for the elderly.  
 
The European Commission conducted a noticeable shift in its policy on social inclusion in 
2012 when six countries received recommendations accordingly and seven in 2013, also 
acknowledging accompanying measures in addition to labour activation. Therefore, CSRs 
from 2012 onwards tend to be more and more in line with the social democratic model e.g. 
in the case of Bulgaria the CSRs suggest “to alleviate poverty, improve the effectiveness of 
social transfers and the access to quality social services for children and elderly and 
implement National Roma integration”124 to compliment labour activation measures. On a 
similar note, the European Commission urges Latvia and Spain “to tackle high rates of 
poverty and social exclusion by reforming the social assistance system to make it more 
efficient, while better protecting the poor,”125 and to compliment labour activation 
measures by implementing “effective child and family support services in order to improve 
the situation of people at-risk-of-poverty and or social exclusion, consequently to achieve 
the well-being of children.”126 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands were advised to 
reform their housing market by increasing availability and affordability in the case of the 
United Kingdom and by aligning rents of social housing with household incomes in the 
Netherlands, while also providing more market oriented pricing mechanisms. This 
illustrates a degree of inconsistency, as the one country is supposed to regulate its housing 
market more while the other is supposed to rely more on market mechanisms. 
  
The CSRs for 2013 read very similar to the ones in 2012, especially for Latvia, Romania 
and Spain which should reform e.g. social assistance for better coverage, improve benefit 
adequacy, and social transfers combined with activation measures. The United Kingdom 
also received advice to better support low income households by ensuring that the 
Universal Credit and other welfare reforms deliver a fair tax benefit system.”127 
Furthermore, the inclusiveness of the education system is on the agenda of the European 
Commission in several countries, including Germany and Hungary, while Romania should 	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reform its health sector to “increase its efficiency, quality and accessibility in particular for 
disadvantaged people and remote isolated communities.”128 Bulgaria is likewise expected 
to “ensure effective access to health care and improve the pricing of health care 
services.”129 The Netherlands continued to receive recommendations to reform social 
housing.  
 
In summary the European Commission seems to respond to growing inequalities and social 
exclusion as of 2012, whereas this concern seemed marginal in 2011. However, the 
number of such recommendations remains comparatively low and appears to be limited to 
worst-case examples. Furthermore, the limited number of these recommendations stands in 
contrast to the omnipresence of fiscal consolidation and austerity that can put pressure on 
public services and benefit systems that are meant to alleviate poverty and inequalities. In 
the final event, the European Commission does not seem to question the premises of neo-
liberalism evident in other policy areas, such as wage policy that contributes to growing 
inequalities. The strong focus on marginalized groups is a far cry from the social 
democratic premises of universality, and is instead firmly in line with the liberal model.  
 
6. Social Partner Involvement 
 
Although it is not a policy area per se, a nonetheless exceedingly interesting aspect of the 
CSRs for the current discussion is the European Commission's expectation of social 
partner involvement, for the two following reasons. Firstly, the Communication on 
Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU calls for a stronger role of the social 
dialogue and the social partners. Therefore, the CSRs offer insights to the current state of 
play, especially bearing in mind the REFIT Communication that actually halted a social 
dialogue agreement for the first time. Examination of the role attributed to the social 
partnership in the CSRs may therefore indicate the future outlook of the social dimension 
of the EMU. Secondly, social dialogue is a fundamental aspect of the social democratic 
and the Conservative social policy models. The European Commission's attitude towards 
the social dialogue is therefore a relevant factor in assessing its policy preference. The 
third reason why social partner involvement is of interest is that trade unions representing 
labour in the social partnership are proponents of Social Europe. In turn, the 	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recommendations and expectations towards the social partners are potentially telling of 
hegemonic power relations within the European Commission. 
 
While the overall number of recommendations in most policy areas increased during the 
course of the period under observation, it is a striking feature that the reverse is true for 
CSRs calling on social partner involvement in the policy-making process. Whereas the 
European Commission called on eleven countries to involve social partners in the 
implementation of their recommendations in 2011, this number dropped to five and seven 
in 2012 and 2013 respectively.  
 
The European Commission still expects social partner involvement in a number of policy 
areas described above, including pensions and effective and statutory retirement age, wage 
formation, as well as labour protection and labour rights.  In 2011, Finland and Austria 
received recommendations to consult social partners in the process of improving “the 
employability of older workers” and “to encourage older workers to stay in the labour 
market.”130 Slovenia should, in consultation with social partners, reduce asymmetries in 
rights and obligations guaranteed under permanent and temporary contracts. 
 
However, the majority of cases in which the European Commission seeks social partner 
involvement concern the abolishment of wage indexation systems where these are in place, 
such as in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta. In addition, some recommendations 
seek to review labour protection legislation in France, align wages with productivity in 
France and Bulgaria, as well as reform of collective bargaining in France and Spain. In the 
case of the latter, the CSRs seek the decentralisation of collective bargaining and enabling 
local and firm level bargaining in Spain. This does not include instances were similar 
recommendations were made without consulting with the social partners. In effect, these 
measures weaken the bargaining position of trade unions and reduce coverage by 
collective agreements.131 These policy measures essentially foster the kind of 
competitiveness that is based on internal devaluation.132 
 
The overall scope of CSRs seeking social partner involvement suggests a stronger position 
of employers in collective bargaining and an attempt to raise competitiveness through 	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internal devaluation. This implies downward pressure on wages, more of the kind of 
flexible employment that is beneficial to employers, but does not necessarily meet the 
needs of employees, as well as a general weakening of labour protection. The likely 
outcome of this is contrary to the goals of the social democratic model to achieve social 
cohesion and greater equality, instead the European Commission recommendations 
actually generate pressure on trade unions challenging a fundamental element of the social 
democratic and Conservative social policy models. In contrast when the European 
Commission seeks to implement measures in favour of labour rights such as in the case of 
limiting the excessive use civil law contracts in Poland, as described above, the European 
Commission does not seek social partner involvement. This suggests that the role that the 
European Commission attributes to the social partnership is primarily one in which 
downward convergence is legitimised by trade unions, which should uphold higher 
standards. This places them in a difficult position, mocking their role in the social 
partnership and providing institutional backing to the employers' organisations shifting the 
balance in a direction that is more favourable of the liberal model, which does not feature a 
great regard for trade union rights. 
 
This is perhaps the most telling instance in which the European Commission seems 
dominated by a neo-liberal hegemony not just issuing recommendations that are 
undesirable to labour interests and contrary to the social democratic model, but also 
undermining trade unions as agents in the fabric of the social democratic historic bloc.  
 
7. Economic Policy 
 
Finally, the CSRs comprise a range of economic policy recommendations. Although the 
focus of this paper is on social policy developments, it is worthwhile to consider a brief 
overview of the kind of economic policies that the European Commission suggests to 
member states. This will help provide a complete picture of the content of the CSRs and to 
assess if and to what extent economic policies have an impact on and/or interact with 
social policy, especially with a view to potential policy hierarchies.  
 
As a result of bank bailouts that were deemed necessary in many countries in the wake of 
the financial crisis to revitalise struggling financial institutions, the European Commission 
issued a number of recommendations to restructure the banks concerned, in order to return 
40 
	  
them to private ownership and restore their normal functioning in the economy. Also 
related to the causes of the crisis some countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom were issued with CSRs addressing risks and preventive 
measures in their housing markets related to the recommendations described above.  
 
The majority of CSRs, however, deal with economic and competition policies in particular, 
with a view to fostering greater competition especially in the service- and retail sectors, as 
well as in network industries such as gas, electricity and transport. In this context, some 
countries were also advised to invest in network infrastructure, create incentives for 
research and development in the private sector, and open access to the provision of public 
services and public procurement. Further measures address the efficiency of public 
administration and other services and proposals to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
the judicial system in order to speed up court procedures and fight corruption. In addition, 
member states are often encouraged to open up regulated professions and reduce entry 
barriers. 
 
In other areas too, the European Commission deems it necessary for member states to 
simplify or remove regulation perceived as restrictive by businesses for example by 
recommending them to “reduce the administrative burden for enterprises”133 or “improve 
business environment by cutting red tape,”134 Indeed, this is a reoccurring theme in CSRs, 
which will be described in the following section as it lends itself to a broader discussion in 
which the findings of this paper will be viewed from a neo-Gramscian perspective. 
 
Discussion 
 
The European Commission's efforts to simplify or remove regulation is particularly telling 
of hegemonic power relations as it can sometimes clash with social policies, where 
legislation is designed to protect e.g. citizens as consumers or the rights of workers. After 
all, it is under the pretext of phrases that can also be found in the CSRs such as “improving 
business environment” and “cutting red tape” that the European Commission launched its 
REFIT agenda.135 It is in this context that the European Commission halted for the first 
time a proposal on work place health and safety in the hairdressing sector reached between 	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the respective employer's organisation and trade union and calling into question the 
sincerity of the Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of the EMU,136 
both published on the same day. This suggests that where they clash, economic policies 
trump social polices, and business interests take precedence over labour rights. Something 
that is also evident in a benchmark ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU in the so-called 
Laval judgment,137 which essentially “restricted the rights of trade unions in respect of 
posted workers on the basis of fundamental economic freedoms, which were considered as 
more important than fundamental social rights.”138 This in turn encouraged many 
employers to bend the existing legislation in order to exploit posted workers. The same 
policy hierarchy is also reflected in the recommendations described above in section 2. on 
structural labour market reform which sought to reduce social security contributions for 
low wage workers and reduce tax on labour, with potentially detrimental effects on social 
welfare while enabling businesses to hire employees at lower wages. Likewise, some 
countries were advised to invest in network infrastructure, and create incentives for 
research and development, which also implies public spending to enable private businesses 
to be more profitable. Therefore, it becomes evident that the European Commission's credo 
of fiscal austerity and public spending cuts does not equally apply to all areas of spending. 
Although investment is a desirable goal, also expressed by proponents of a Social Europe 
such as the European Trade Union Confederation in its proposal against austerity and for 
alternatives,139 it is of some concern that the European Commission appears to promote 
investment to create a corporate welfare model in the place of a social democratic one. 
This resonates with the assessment of the European Trade Union Institute that “the CSRs 
convey ideas associated with a particular 'model' of the EU, insofar as they are focused on 
growth and competitiveness while totally neglecting what constitutes the principal role of 
social policies, namely, to ensure social cohesion and some degree of redistribution.”140 
Correspondingly, the findings of this paper suggest that the European Commission is 
committed to establishing a European social policy model, albeit one motivated by neo-	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liberal principles, in which the policies that are promoted by the European Commission 
closely resemble the ideal type of liberal model exemplified by the United Kingdom or 
Ireland.  Common policy themes include for example fiscal consolidation as a guiding 
premise, minimum income schemes, and a limited focus on most vulnerable groups.   
 
This peculiar vision of a European social policy model is obviously not what proponents of 
Social Europe envisioned when they formulated their demands, as it has the potential to 
facilitate the downwards convergence of social standards across Europe. By facilitating the 
implementation of such a social policy model the neo-liberal hegemonic project forestalls a 
more ambitious social policy model based on social democratic motives, thus it “seeks to 
advance neoliberalism through a strategy of incorporating, and ideologically neutralizing, 
rival projects.”141 From a neo-Gramscian perspective, it seems as if social democracy as a 
hegemonic counter project has not left its mark on the current policy-making of the EU.   
 
It is important to note that the European Commission is of course not to be held solely 
responsible for these developments. Rather, its decisions and policy preferences reflect the 
ideological hegemony that is advocated by some social classes and accepted by others. 
Indeed, the European Commission's decisions are reflective of societal choices, which are, 
nevertheless, increasingly subject to scrutiny. This is not least due to the impact of the 
financial and economic crisis on the socio-economic fabric of member states, as it forced 
an entire generation, especially in Southern Europe, to question the premise of neo-
liberalism that attributes such a great deal of responsibility to the individual for economic 
success or failure. In turn, the structural mechanisms behind overt social inequality are no 
longer blindly accepted.  
 
Although the findings of this paper point to a predominately neo-liberal direction, it 
appears that there were some concessions made to social considerations nonetheless. As 
indicated above, some aspects of the CSRs suggest internal debate within the European 
Commission, and Commissioner Andor acknowledged that the current Commission made 
significant concessions to social democracy. For example, with regard to financial 
regulation, he stated in an interview that, “we made a lot more progress with financial 
sector regulation than the previous college, thanks mainly to Michel Barnier 
[Commissioner for Internal Market and Services] and all those who supported him. The 	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situation indeed allowed and demanded a departure from neo-liberalism.”142 Political 
parties too, have begun to challenge neo-liberal hegemony, and social democratic parties in 
particular are searching for a new outlook for their political agenda following their 
flirtations with neo-liberalism during the phase of Third Way politics.143 In this quest, they 
are also supported by intellectuals who, true to the neo-Gramscian notion of organic 
intellectuals, form part of an historic bloc that challenges the basic assumptions of neo-
liberalism.144 Another element that suggests the formation of a historic bloc to challenge 
the existing paradigm is the wide range of social and protest movements that have emerged 
in recent years. These include for example the Occupy movement, and trade unions that 
are increasingly opposed to neo-liberal restructuring.145 The paradigm shift is also evident 
on a European level in the strong support for the first successful European Citizen 
Initiative Right2Water that brought together a broad coalition of actors opposed to the 
liberalisation of water services in the EU.  
 
While the current capacity of this historic bloc to mobilise the European Commission as an 
institution remains limited due to its overarching acceptance of neo-liberal hegemony, it 
remains to be seen if the new College of Commissioners to be put in place after the 
European Parliament election in May 2014 will be capable of performing a significant 
policy shift. This of course depends in part on the capacity of left parties to mobilise the 
needed electoral support to pursue Social Europe as an alternative to both neo-liberal 
hegemony and Euro-sceptic parties.  
 
On the one hand, the European Commission's current vision of the European social policy 
model is likely to mobilise Euro-sceptic voters to make their voice heard against further 
integration, holding Brussels-based decision-making accountable for the sometimes 
detrimental developments in a number of member states. Nevertheless, European 
institutions are beginning to pay attention to demands for more Social Europe. The 
European Economic and Social Committee already recognised this in an opinion from 	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2008, requested by the French Presidency of the European Union on its views on a new 
European Social Action Programme, from which it is worth quoting in length: 
Contrary to Euro-sceptic demands for less-Europe, we in our EESC consultations 
and citizens' forums ... have repeatedly heard the deafening call for more social 
Europe. From Stockholm, to Edinburgh, from Dublin to Wrocław, each time, we 
have heard citizens speaking up for a Europe of solidarity, a Europe of values, a 
Europe, which embraces globalisation, but not in a race to the bottom, not putting 
profit before people, a Europe of inclusion and opportunity, of innovation and 
entrepreneurship, of decent working conditions and secure living standards. There 
is a steady and vocal call for a new progressive social consensus. - Europe should 
listen and Europe should act.146 
 
The 2014 European elections will show to what extent the current neo-liberal hegemony 
will be challenged and if this challenge will be based on the prospect of Social Europe, or 
disillusionment with integration. At any rate, the European elections will prompt the need 
for further research in this field, and the CSRs, issued on an annual basis, will continue to 
provide empirical evidence to monitor and track the European Commission's future policy 
choices.  
 
Overall, the neo-Gramscian perspective applied in this study offers a valid route to 
assessing hegemonic power relations in European Commission decision-making, and 
succeeds in opening a concrete gateway to approaching the discourse on Social Europe.   
 
One shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it can only trace outcomes and not 
processes, therefore it cannot necessarily predict the policy choices of the European 
Commission or assess the process by which the European Commission arrives at its 
decisions. This is why future research could be directed at the internal debates within the 
European Commission that lead to particular policy outcomes, or the role of the Council of 
the EU and e.g. the position of individual governments within it. This would be a relevant 
area of inquiry as in the past the veto right was used to block social policy, as noted by the 
European Economic and Social Committee: “Social policy measures proposed by the 
Commission and endorsed by the European Parliament and European Economic and Social 
Committee hit the immovable buffer of the liberum veto now actively employed in Council 
especially by one particular Government.”147 It is for example possible that this same 	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government continues to use other channels to prevent social policy to be implemented, 
which could imply that this government is dominated by social classes and interest groups 
committed to the neo-liberal project, offering an additional level of analysis for hegemonic 
power relations within the EU in which the incumbent hegemony displays the capability to 
block policies that could challenge its basic premises and thereby lock-in policy in a more 
favourable mode. However, since the introduction of qualified majority voting, the 
mobilisation of a greater number of member states is required to achieve this. Conducting 
research on the internal workings of the European Commission and the Council of the EU 
would, however, require a much more intrusive approach than the analysis of official 
documents can provide, therefore, other methods such as expert interviews could be 
applied.  
 
Furthermore, the CSRs illustrate yet another dynamic, not within, but between institutions 
namely the European Commission and the Council of the EU. It is striking that for 
example the text containing the recommendations for the euro area proposed by the 
European Commission differs from the final version adopted by the Council of the EU, 
which added an additional package of recommendations that highlights many of the policy 
preferences expressed by the CSRs. One possible explanation for this could be that 
national governments use the EU as a forum to push through reform that they could not 
pursue domestically without political damage. This would imply that the European 
Commission is used as a scapegoat by politicians at a national level. In this view, Euro-
scepticism would be a welcome distraction from domestic issues that are underlying EU 
policies. One way to approach this could be a computer assisted content analysis to detect 
divergences between the wording of the European Commission proposals and the final 
versions adopted by the Council of the EU.    
 
Conclusion: The Social Chimera of the EMU  
 
In conclusion, the answer to the research question if the impact of the crisis led to a visible 
revival of Social Europe in EU policy-making is negative. To date, Social Europe 
continues to take a back seat in EU policy-making and neo-liberal hegemony remains 
paramount. The analysis of the CSRs indicates that the overall policy outlook of European 
Economic Governance continues to be guided by neo-liberal principles with regard to 
economic as well as social policy. However, it can be argued from a neo-Gramscian 
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perspective that the small, but increasing number of concessions made to the social 
democratic model, when placed at the backdrop of broader social developments, including 
the rise for social movements critical of neo-liberal restructuring, suggest an increasing 
relevance of the historic bloc around social democracy. Although the tentative outcome 
appears to be that neo-liberalism is holding on to its hegemonic position, this is not the 
final assessment, as the open-ended nature of a neo-Gramscian perspective accounts for the 
possibility of change. Hence the evolution of hegemonic order must be subject to 
continued scrutiny. 
 
Furthermore, this study yielded additional findings that were not anticipated at its 
conception. For example, it suggests that the European Commission is indirectly 
promoting a certain social policy model through the CSRs, which resembles the liberal 
model. This is somewhat contrary to the literature describing social policy models in 
Europe, which found no evidence for a European level social policy model. In addition, 
there is evidence that the European Commission's recommendations appear to grant 
preference to corporate welfare over social welfare, meaning that the CSRs promote fiscal 
austerity in areas of social spending, while advising redistributive schemes that benefit 
private business and to some extent subsidise private profits. These recommendations 
could potentially have far reaching consequences if applied by national governments, as 
they would alter the basic premises of the social fabric of many member states, with the 
potential consequence of locking-in neo-liberal policy beyond the capacity of neo-liberal 
hegemony to mobilise the necessary institutional resources to pursue such policies in the 
first place.  
 
Perhaps Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, was right when he stated 
in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that “the European social model has already 
gone,”148 or at least it has not made much of an appearance in the mechanisms of European 
Economic Governance. In light of the gaining importance of these mechanisms and their 
implications for social policy, it is important for European citizens and proponents of 
Social Europe to be aware of and understand the current European Commission agenda 
and the long-term objectives it pursues with its policy recommendations. Indeed, the 
results of this study make the argument of Ronald Jansen plausible, when he claimed that 	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hidden behind the social language of the Communication on Strengthening the Social 
Dimension of the EMU is “a Trojan horse for Social Europe,”149 suggesting that the 
outgoing European Commission together with the majority in the Council of the EU are 
masking their real intentions when promoting its fundamentally neo-liberal social policies.  
 
Despite evident counter currents, notably in institutions such as the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and even within the European Commission, 
I can only concur with this view as the findings of this paper unveil the sometimes delusive 
social language in the CSRs that seems to be used to hide what really constitutes the neo-
liberal restructuring of member states' social policy models. In light of this, the outcomes 
that can be expected from the Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of 
the EMU will be a Social Chimera at best, or worse, Europe's established social policy 
models will vanish along with the trappings of social language in which the European 
Commission dressed its proposals.  
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Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of the Czech Republic and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Updated Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, 
Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Denmark and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Denmark, 2011-2015. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Estonia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Estonia, 2011-2015. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Finland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Finland, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of France and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of France, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Germany and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Germany, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Greece. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Hungary and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Hungary, 2011-2015. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
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Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Ireland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Ireland, 2011-2015. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Italy, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Latvia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Latvia, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Lithuania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Lithuania, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Luxembourg and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Updated Stability Programme of Luxembourg, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Malta and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Malta, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of the Netherlands and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Updated Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2011-2015. 12 July 2011, 
Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Poland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Poland, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Portugal. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Romania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Romania, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Slovakia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Slovakia, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Slovenia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Slovenia, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
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Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Spain and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Stability Programme of Spain, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of Sweden and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Updated 
Convergence Programme of Sweden, 2011-2014. 12 July 2011, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2011 of the United Kingdom and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Updated Convergence Programme of the United Kingdom, 2011-2014. 12 July 
2011, Brussels. 
 
 
Available on the European Commission website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-
recommendations/2011/index_en.htm  
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List of Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) 2012 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Austria and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Austria, 2011-2016. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Belgium and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Belgium, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Bulgaria and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Cyprus and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Cyprus, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of the Czech Republic and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Denmark and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Denmark, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Estonia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Estonia, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Finland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Finland, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of France and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of France, 2012-2016. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Germany and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Germany, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Greece. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Hungary and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Hungary, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
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Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Ireland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Ireland, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Italy, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Latvia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Latvia, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Lithuania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Lithuania, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Luxembourg and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Luxembourg, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Malta and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Malta, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of the Netherlands and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Poland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Poland, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Portugal and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Portugal, 2012-2016. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Romania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Romania, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Slovakia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Slovakia, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Slovenia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Slovenia, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
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Programme 2012 of Spain and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Spain, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Sweden and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Sweden, 2012-2015. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of the United Kingdom and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of the United Kingdom, 2012-2017. 6 July 2012, Brussels. 
 
 
Available on the European Commission website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-
recommendations/2012/index_en.htm   
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List of Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) 2013 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Austria and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Austria, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Belgium and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Belgium, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Bulgaria and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Bulgaria, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of the Czech Republic and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of the Czech Republic, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Denmark and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Denmark, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Estonia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Estonia, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Finland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Finland, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of France and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of France, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Germany and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Germany, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Hungary and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Hungary, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Italy, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Latvia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Latvia, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
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Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Lithuania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Lithuania, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Luxembourg and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Luxembourg, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Malta and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Malta, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of the Netherlands and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2012-2017. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Poland and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Poland, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Romania and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of Romania, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Slovakia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Slovakia, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Slovenia and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Slovenia, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Spain and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Spain, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Sweden and Delivering a Council Opinion on the Convergence 
Programme of Sweden, 2012-2016. 9 July 2013, Brussels. 
 
Council of the European Union. Council Recommendation on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of the United Kingdom and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 
Convergence Programme of the United Kingdom, 2012/13 to 2017/18. 9 July 2013, 
Brussels. 
 
 
Available on the European Commission website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-
recommendations/2013/index_en.htm  
